The Conflict-Monitoring Hypothesis
The conflict-monitoring hypothesis posits a neural mechanism that supports the adaptive control of behavior in situations like the Stroop task. According to the conflict-monitoring hypothesis, a specific subsystem of the human brain, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), responds to conflict in information processing. The detection of conflict triggers adjustments in cognitive control (e.g., by reinforcing goal representations) via the prefrontal cortex in order to reduce conflict in subsequent performance (Botvinick, Cohen, & Carter, 2004) . For example, on an incongruent Stroop trial, the color word and the display color produce response conflict. This response conflict is detected by the ACC, which signals the prefrontal cortex that is responsible for enhancing top-down control (e.g., by enhancing the strength of goal representation), thus reducing conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001 .
The Conflict-Monitoring Model of Stroop Performance Botvinick et al. (2001) implemented their conflict-monitoring hypothesis in a series of neural network simulations. Their approach consisted of adding a conflict-monitoring module, representing the ACC, to extant computational models of various tasks (e.g., Stroop). In these simulations, activation within the conflictmonitoring module increased or decreased as a function of the amount of conflict between response units in the neural network. Using this basic architecture, Botvinick et al. simulated both behavioral manifestations of cognitive control and brain activation in the ACC.
For the present purposes, the most relevant of these simulations is the one relating to the Stroop effect. To simulate the Stroop effect, Botvinick et al. (2001) used a version (Cohen & Huston, 1994) of Cohen, Dunbar, and McClelland's (1990) popular model of performance in the Stroop task. A brief overview of Cohen et al.'s (1990) model appears here, but we refer the reader to the original article for a more complete treatment. Cohen et al.'s (1990) model (see Figure 1) consists of a colorprocessing pathway and a word-processing pathway. These pathways feed activation through to a common set of response units. It is the competition between these response units that Botvinick et al. (2001) used as an index of conflict in information processing. Given that we are more practiced at reading words than naming colors, the connection weights between the word units and the response units are stronger than those between the color units and the response units. This difference in the connection weights gives rise to the asymmetrical interference pattern where words interfere with color naming more than colors interfere with word naming. This asymmetry in the strength of connections along the two processing pathways creates the need for a selective attention mechanism; otherwise the model would simply read the word on every trial. In Cohen et al.'s model, selective attention is instantiated through a set of task demand units, subsequently argued to reside in the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2004) , that serve to strengthen activation along the relevant pathway. In Botvinick et al.'s (2001) model, the conflict monitor sends a signal to the task demand units altering its input to the color pathway thus strengthening the connection between input and response node. Botvinick et al. (2001) first demonstrated that their conflictmonitoring module, adjoined to the response units in the Cohen et al. (1990) framework, behaved in a fashion similar to that found in brain activation studies of the ACC. For example, they demonstrated that activity in the conflict module was higher in the incongruent condition (e.g., the word red in BLUE) than in the neutral (e.g., the word house in BLUE) and congruent conditions (e.g., the word blue in BLUE). Numerous imaging studies have reported a similar pattern of brain activation in the ACC while participants performed a Stroop task (e.g., Carter et al., 2000; Kerns et al., 2004) .
In a second set of simulations, Botvinick et al. (2001) demonstrated that this conflict-monitoring module could serve as a signaling device for control-related processes to adapt to the presence Cohen, K. Dunbar, and J. L. McClelland, 1990, Psychological Review, 97, p. 336. Copyright 1990 by the American Psychological Association.
of conflict in information processing. On each trial, the conflictmonitoring module provided a control signal to the task demand units. High levels of conflict increased the input from the task demand units to the color pathway, whereas low levels of conflict reduced the input from the task demand units.
1 Botvinick et al. (2001) simulated the proportion-congruent effect, a prominent control phenomenon in the Stroop literature. This effect refers to the observation that the relative proportion of congruent trials in an experimental list affects the magnitude of the Stroop effect (e.g., Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Tzelgov, Henik, & Berger, 1992) . That is, the magnitude of the Stroop effect increases as the proportion of congruent trials increases. Botvinick et al. (2001) demonstrated that their model simulates this pattern of data. As the proportion of congruent trials increases, the amount of conflict in the system decreases, leading to a decrease in top-down control (i.e., input from the task demand unit to the color pathway). This decrease in top-down control results in a larger Stroop effect because the word pathway exerts a stronger influence on the response nodes. Thus, the implementation of the conflictmonitoring hypothesis in the form of a computational neural network model accounts for cognitive control in both brain activation and behavioral studies.
In the present investigation, we attempted to model a more recent instance of cognitive control, the item-specific proportioncongruent (ISPC) effect (Jacoby, Lindsay, & Hessels, 2003) , in the context of the conflict-monitoring hypothesis and more specifically within Botvinick et al.'s (2001) conflict-monitoring model of Stroop performance.
The ISPC Effect Jacoby and colleagues (Jacoby et al., 2003; Jacoby, McElree, & Trainham, 1999; Trainham, Lindsay, & Jacoby, 1997) have demonstrated that the magnitude of the Stroop effect is affected by the proportion of congruent trials at the item level. For example, Jacoby et al. (2003) varied the proportion of congruent trials at the level of specific items (i.e., a specific pairing of a color word and color) while keeping the list-level congruency proportion at 50% and found that items that were "mostly congruent" showed a larger Stroop effect than items that were "mostly incongruent." They referred to this item-level effect as the ISPC effect. Jacoby et al. (2003) claimed that a control mechanism like Cohen et al.'s (1990) and by association Botvinick et al.'s (2001) , where a single task demand unit controls attention to all items within a processing pathway, could not account for this effect.
The reason Cohen et al.'s (1990) and Botvinick et al.'s (2001) models encounter difficulty in explaining the ISPC effect is because control operates at the level of the color pathway, rather than at the level of individual color representations. As previously discussed, Botvinick et al.'s (2001) model simulated the list-level proportion-congruent (LLPC) effect with a conflict module that signaled the task demand unit to increase or decrease input to the color pathway. Critically, increasing or decreasing the task demand unit's input to the color pathway affects the processing of all colors. Implementing control in this manner is unlikely to be able to explain the ISPC effect because the ISPC effect suggests that control can occur at the level of individual items.
Rather than discarding Botvinick et al.'s (2001) model of control in Stroop performance, we suggest that an amendment to this model will allow it to account for the ISPC effect. Specifically, we suggest that control has to be implemented at the item level.
Present Investigation
The present investigation tests the hypothesis that a conflictmonitoring model based on Cohen et al.'s (1990) model of Stroop performance can account for the ISPC effect when control is implemented at the item level but not when control is implemented at the pathway level.
In the first set of simulations, we added a conflict module to Cohen et al.'s (1990) model of Stroop performance and attempted to simulate the ISPC effect with control acting at the pathway level. As suggested, this approach failed to simulate the ISPC effect. Next, we implemented control at the item level and demonstrated that the model was then able to simulate the ISPC effect. Thus, by implementing control at the item level rather than the pathway level we were able to simulate the ISPC effect using the principles outlined in the conflict-monitoring hypothesis.
Computational Properties of the Model
Architecture Cohen et al.'s (1990) model has already been briefly described above. Our implementation of this part of the model did not include a learning algorithm.
2 As such, the connection weights were hard-coded, rather than learned (cf. Cohen et al., 1990) , to values that had been used successfully in other simulations with four response alternatives (Kanne, Balota, Spieler, & Faust, 1998) . These are shown in Table 1 . The remaining details of this model are not critical to the implementation of control but are presented in the Appendix. What follows is a discussion of the modifications introduced by Botvinick et al. (2001) and those introduced by us for the current simulations. Botvinick et al.'s (2001) most significant change to Cohen et al.'s (1990) model was the introduction of a control-monitoring device. This device relies on a measure of the "energy" in the response units (Hopfield, 1982) to determine the degree of conflict resulting from a given trial. Hopfield's formula is provided in Equation 1:
E H then acted as the input to a formula that determined the extent of control to be exerted (Equation 2):
where C(t) is control on trial t, E(t) is the energy at the end of trial t, is a weighting parameter (restricted to values between 0 and 1) that indicates the degree to which control will change on each trial, and ␣ and ␤ are scaling parameters. Theoretically, parameters ␣ and ␤ are uninteresting as they simply scale the energy value to a range that will have a functional role at the control level. Conversely, the parameter is very important. It functionally operates as a memory "buffer." When is large, the memory buffer contains information about the amount of conflict on many previous trials and, as such, "history" dominates the control value. When this value is small, the memory buffer heavily weights the amount of conflict on the most recent trial and, as such, the "previous trial" dominates the control setting. Consistent with this interpretation, when simulating LLPC effects, Botvinick et al. (2001) set to a large value (.95), presumably reflecting the dominant view in the field that proportion effects result from participants recognizing that the word is informative and thus actively reading it on every (or most) trial(s). Also, when simulating sequential effects, was set to a relatively smaller value (.50) consistent with the view that participants are affected by the previous trial's congruency. In all the present simulations, ␣ was 21.01873, ␤ was Ϫ5.41268, and was .50. C(t) provides the weight for the connections from the task demand unit to the relevant word/color units for the next trial, subject to the constraint that the connection weights must fall between 2.3 and 4.0. That is, at the end of each trial control is calculated according to Equation 3, and the weights on the relevant connections are then set to C(t ϩ 1). Details about which connections are adjusted and under what circumstances follow a brief discussion of the differences between Botvinick et al.'s (2001) approach and ours.
Due to the cascaded (as opposed to interactive activation) nature of our model (chosen for ease of implementation), certain adjustments to the equations specified above are required. First, as our model does not include within-level inhibitory connections, we adjusted Equation 1 to reflect the assumption that connections between response units are Ϫ1.0. Furthermore, the Hopfield formula as described in Equation 1 cycles over each pair of units twice. This makes sense only if connections between units are not symmetric (i.e., unit i inhibits unit j more than unit j inhibits unit i ), however, when connections are symmetric between any two units, there is no need to compare each pair twice. The assumption of unit negative inhibition implies that all connections are symmetric so our formula calculates the energy for each pair only once. These changes represent minor adjustments to the original formula and give rise to (Equation 3):
As with Botvinick et al.'s (2001) approach, energy is calculated on the basis of activation in the response units. This energy provides the input to a formula that calculates control in the same way described by Botvinick et al. (2001; Equation 2 ). Pathway-level control (Model P). Our implementation of pathway control (see Figure 2 ) differs slightly from that described in Botvinick et al. (2001) . In lieu of adjusting the activation of the task demand unit, the connection weights between the task demand units and the relevant color or word units were modified. When implementing the item-specific mechanism, we found that changing the connection weights rather than activity in the task demand unit was more tractable. Implementing an item-specific mechanism via changing activity in the task demand unit would require a move from two task demand units representing word and color to eight separate task demand units representing the four color words and the four colors. The present option is less cumbersome and does not require a drastic change to the architecture of the underlying model. Mathematically these are equivalent operations as the effect on units in the subsequent layers is given by the weight of the connection multiplied by the activation strength (please refer to Paragraph 1 of the Appendix). Whether one doubles the activation level in the task demand unit or the weight between the task demand unit and the relevant color/word units, the net result will be a doubling of the input from the task demand unit.
Item-level control (Model I). Our implementation of itemlevel control (see Figure 3) involves modifying only the connection from the task demand unit to the hidden unit that was associated with the color that was relevant on that trial. For illustration, if the task is color naming, and the previous trial consisted of the word red presented in BLUE (an incongruent trial), C(t) would be large, and thus the weight on the connection to the presented color (BLUE) is increased to reflect increased attention. Conversely if the previous trial was congruent (e.g., the word red presented in RED), C(t) would be relatively small, and the weight on the connection to the presented color (RED) would be decreased. The operation of control is the only way in which Models P and I differ.
Simulation 1: The ISPC Effect
Here, we compare the ability of Model P and Model I to simulate the ISPC effect. In Model P, control is implemented at the pathway level following Botvinick et al. (2001) , and in Model I control is implemented at the item level.
One thousand randomized lists of 192 (48 practice, 144 experimental) items were constructed such that the words blue and red appeared mostly incongruent and the words yellow and green appeared mostly congruent. The relationship between items and congruency was consistent within the practice and experimental trials. Table 2 shows the trial structure. These lists were presented to both versions of the model.
Analysis. Following Botvinick et al. (2001) , for each list, the 48 practice trials served to allow the task weights in the model an opportunity to settle. The remaining 144 experimental trials were analyzed for the presence of an ISPC effect. Table 3 shows the average in each condition across the 1,000 simulations for each version of the model. As is evident in Figure 4 , Model P shows no trace of an ISPC effect. Specifically, across the 1,000 simulations, the average size of the Stroop effect (incongruent-congruent) for the "mostly congruent" items is 164.2 cycles, and the average size of the Stroop effect for the "mostly incongruent" items is 163.5 cycles. Model I, however, shows an ISPC effect of 30.2 cycles. The size of the Stroop effect for the "mostly congruent" items is 191.5 cycles, and the size of the Stroop effect for the "mostly incongruent" items is 161.3 cycles.
Discussion. In Simulation 1, Model P failed and Model I succeeded in simulating the ISPC effect. The only difference between these two models was the level at which control was implemented. Not surprisingly, when control was implemented at the level of the pathway the model did not produce an ISPC effect. However, when control was implemented at the level of the item, the model readily produced an ISPC effect. Thus, with control implemented at the item level, the ISPC effect can be added to a growing list of control-related phenomena that are explicable in terms of a conflict-monitoring mechanism. In a second set of simulations, we tested the ability of the item-level mechanism just introduced to account for an LLPC effect.
Simulation 2: The LLPC Effect
Some researchers (Jacoby et al., 1999; Trainham et al., 1997) have suggested that the ISPC effect and the LLPC effect could emerge from a similar mechanism. Essentially, LLPC manipulations could be construed as item-level manipulations with all items sharing the same congruency proportion. Thus, it is possible that the list-level effect is simply an ISPC effect in disguise. We tested this possibility in Simulation 2 by simulating the LLPC effect using both Model P and Model I. The magnitude of the proportioncongruent effect in Model P relative to Model I should determine the extent to which the LLPC effect can be considered an ISPC effect, at least within the context of the present model.
One thousand randomized lists of 192 items each were constructed. In 500 of the lists, 25% of the items were congruent. In the remaining 500 lists, 75% of the items were congruent. Table 4 shows the trial structure for each of these lists. All of these lists were presented to each version of the model.
Analysis. As in Simulation 1, the first 48 trials in each list served to allow the task weights in the model an opportunity to settle. The remaining 144 trials in each list were analyzed for the presence of a proportion effect. Table 5 shows the average in each condition across the 1,000 simulations for each version of the model. As is evident in Figure 5 , both Model P and Model I show an LLPC effect. For Model P, the size of the Stroop effect for the 25% lists is 143.9 cycles, and the size of the Stroop effect for the 75% lists is 185.9 cycles. For Model I, the size of the Stroop effect for the 25% lists is 158.2 cycles, and the size of the Stroop effect for the 75% lists is 201.3 cycles. The magnitude of the interaction between congruency proportion (25% vs. 75%) and the magnitude of the Stroop effect (incongruent vs. congruent) is nearly identical for both Model P (42.0 cycles) and Model I (43.1 cycles).
Discussion. Both Model P and Model I produced an LLPC effect. In addition, the size of this interaction was the same for both versions of the model. Thus, the LLPC effect can be accounted for by an ISPC effect.
General Discussion
The current investigation presented a computational account of the ISPC effect in the context of the conflict-monitoring hypothesis. The control mechanism hypothesized to account for the ISPC effect was also demonstrated to be able to account for the LLPC effect. In Botvinick et al. (2001) , this latter effect was accounted for via control that operated at the level of the entire pathway. Critically, we showed that this locus of control, although sufficient to account for the LLPC effect, is insufficient to account for the ISPC effect. However, the presently proposed item-level control is both necessary to account for the ISPC effect and sufficient to account for the list-level effect.
In the following sections, we discuss alternative accounts of the ISPC effect, explore the implications of recent conflict-adaptation findings for conflict-monitoring models, present predictions derived from our account of the ISPC effect, and offer some future directions for the conflict-monitoring framework.
Alternative Accounts of the ISPC Effect
An alternative explanation of the ISPC effect attributes it to stimulus-specific priming. Specifically, manipulations of ISPC effects involve increasing the frequency of some stimuli and decreasing the frequency of others and this difference in frequency could produce an ISPC effect (see Table 2 ). For example, in the mostly congruent condition, the congruent stimuli (i.e., yellow-YELLOW and green-GREEN) occurred more often than the incongruent stimuli (i.e., yellow-GREEN and green-YELLOW). In the mostly incongruent condition, the incongruent stimuli (i.e., red-BLUE and blue-RED) occurred more often than the congruent stimuli (i.e., red-RED and blue-BLUE). If increases in frequency of occurrence speeds processing, for example through a priming mechanism, then the Stroop effect should be larger in the mostly congruent condition than in the mostly incongruent condition because congruent trials were more frequent than incongruent trials in the former condition, and incongruent trials were more frequent than congruent trials in the latter condition. Critically, this account would require only that stimulus processing be sensitive to relative frequency. A control mechanism, such as the one proposed here, would not be required. It is important to note that the same stimulus-specific priming mechanism could also account for the global proportion effect. Evidence against a priming account of both the ISPC effect and the global proportion-congruent effect has been provided by numerous researchers (Jacoby et al., 1999 (Jacoby et al., , 2003 Lindsay & Jacoby, 1994; Schmidt, Crump, Cheesman & Besner, 2007) . With respect to the ISPC effect, Jacoby et al. (1999 Jacoby et al. ( , 2003 used the processdissociation procedure and demonstrated that the ISPC manipulation affects the word process and not the color process. If stimulusspecific priming had been responsible for the ISPC effect, the process dissociation procedure should have revealed influences on both the word and color processes. Thus, it appears that the ISPC effect cannot be entirely accounted for by a priming mechanism. Lindsay and Jacoby (1994) , also using the process-dissociation procedure, provided a similar demonstration using a global manipulation of proportion congruence. Jacoby et al.'s (1999 Jacoby et al.'s ( , 2003 results support the need for some form of control mechanism to account for the ISPC effect but suggest an alternative means through which this control is exerted in the context of the Stroop task. Using the process-dissociation procedure, Jacoby et al. (1999 Jacoby et al. ( , 2003 demonstrated that the ISPC manipulations affect the influence of word processes, not the influence of color processes, and they demonstrated the viability of this account in the context of the Stroop Counter model (i.e., by modulating the influence of the word process as a function of proportion congruent). In Botvinick et al.'s (2001) model and the present model, the task demand parameters along the color pathway are modulated to account for proportion-congruent effects. Thus, the two accounts differ with respect to what is being controlled.
At this point it is useful to draw attention to the distinction between the conflict-monitoring hypothesis (i.e., the detection of conflict in the system signals the need for control) and the mechanism responsible for control. Specifically, the conflict-monitoring hypothesis addresses the question of how the need for control is determined (i.e., conflict detection); how control is implemented following the detection of conflict is a separate and independent issue. The models differ only with respect to the latter issue. Jacoby et al.'s (1999) model does not specify how the need for control is determined. We have demonstrated here that a conflictmonitoring module in concert with a control mechanism similar to Botvinick et al.'s (2001) can be used to model the ISPC effect. However, we see no reason why a conflict-monitoring mechanism could not be added to a model that implements control in a different way (such as Jacoby et al.'s, 1999, Stroop Counter model) . The conflict-monitoring hypothesis is not tied to a specific model (e.g., Cohen et al.'s, 1990, Stroop model) , and its application to other existing models (e.g., the Stroop Counter model) represents an interesting direction for future computational work. Botvinick et al.'s (2001) conflict-monitoring model also provides an account of conflict-adaptation effects (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992) . The conflict-adaptation effect in the Stroop task refers to the observation that the size of the Stroop effect is smaller following an incongruent trial than following a congruent trial (Kerns et al., 2004) . According to the conflict-monitoring theory, the conflict-adaptation effect is due to variation in the amount of top-down control on a trial-by-trial basis. Following the detection of conflict on an incongruent trial, the amount of top-down control will be higher, thus reducing the word's influence on the subsequent trial. This would serve to reduce the magnitude of the Stroop effect following incongruent trials.
Conflict-Adaptation Effects
Recent work has suggested that the conflict-adaptation effect may be modulated by stimulus repetition (see Mayr, Awh, & Laurey, 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2006; Ullsperger, Bylsma, & Botvinick, 2005) . The exact relation between stimulus repetition and conflict adaptation is currently unclear, however, it appears that although the conflict-adaptation effect may be reduced after removal of stimulus repetitions, it is not eliminated. This pattern of data is difficult to account for in terms of a conflict-monitoring device. With a pathway-level mechanism, an individual item produces conflict on trial n Ϫ 1, and attention is increased to all items equally, which would reduce the word's impact on trial n for all items. Thus, the conflict-adaptation effect would be unaffected by the inclusion/exclusion of stimulus repetitions. With an item-level mechanism, the item that produces the conflict on trial n Ϫ 1 has attention to it increased. Thus, the word's impact on the following trial would only be reduced when the stimulus repeats.
3 Thus, both Model P and Model I have difficulty explaining the interaction between stimulus repetition and conflict adaptation. However, the results produced by Model P and Model I hint at the possibility that a hybrid model that combines an item-level control mechanism with a pathway-level control mechanism might provide a better account of the conflict-adaptation effect. In this hybrid model, the conflict-adaptation effect should be larger when stimulus repetitions are included rather than excluded because in the latter case the item-specific contribution would be removed and only the item-independent contribution would remain. 4 Such a model is discussed in the Future Directions section.
New Predictions
The utility of a theory and by extension any computational model instantiating that theory is found not just in what it explains but in what new predictions it makes. Critically, the present account of the ISPC effect in terms of conflict monitoring makes a strong prediction that has yet to be tested.
If the ISPC effect is to be explained in the context of the conflict-monitoring hypothesis, as we have proposed, then the ACC, claimed to house the conflict monitor, should be sensitive to conflict at the level of individual items. Specifically, if an ISPC manipulation were employed, ACC activation on incongruent trials should be higher for mostly congruent items than for mostly incongruent items. Critically, Botvinick et al.'s (2001) model predicts no difference between mostly congruent and mostly incongruent items in terms of ACC activation on incongruent trials in the context of an ISPC manipulation. In the only similar study that we are aware of, Carter et al. (2000) demonstrated that, in the context of an LLPC manipulation, ACC activation was highest on incongruent trials in a mostly congruent list. This result, as we demonstrated in the above simulations, is explicable in terms of either item-level control or pathway-level control. It is only with an ISPC manipulation, wherein individual items differ in proportion congruence but the overall list is 50% congruent, that these two theories can be differentiated. This experiment has yet to be conducted, but it is clear that if the ISPC effect is to be explained in the context of the conflict-monitoring hypothesis, the ACC itself would need to be sensitive to conflict at the item level.
A second, more specific, prediction is that if the ISPC effect is the result of ACC modulation, then persons with impaired (e.g., schizophrenics or stroke patients with frontal lobe lesions) or otherwise dysfunctional (e.g., children with attention-deficit/ hyperactivity disorder, see van Meel, Heslenfeld, Oosterlaan, & Sergeant, 2007) ACC function should show a decreased, or no, ISPC effect. Temporary lesions to the ACC made via rapid transcranial magnetic stimulation (see also Gobell, Rushworth, & Walsh, 2006 ) may also reduce the ISPC effect.
Future Directions-A Challenge for Formal Models of Conflict Monitoring?
In Botvinick et al. (2001) , a number of different control mechanisms, all subserved by a conflict-detection device, were introduced to account for various control phenomena. 5 To account for conflict-adaptation effects in the flanker task, they had a conflict monitor signal a unit responsible for the focusing of spatial attention. To account for the error-related slowdown in a two-choice speeded response task, they had a conflict monitor signal a response priming unit that served to shift the system to a new point on the speed-accuracy tradeoff curve. Finally, as discussed here, to account for the LLPC effect in Stroop, they had a conflict monitor signal a task demand unit that increased/decreased selective attention to the color dimension. Here, we have introduced an additional control mechanism (i.e., item-level control) that is able to account for the ISPC effect. In addition, this item-level control mechanism is able to account for the LLPC effect. Thus, the item-specific mechanism is the only mechanism that appears able to account for more than a single phenomenon. Given all of these different control mechanisms that have been postulated, an important future direction for the conflict-monitoring approach is to integrate all of these mechanisms within a single model that produces all relevant phenomena, preferably with a single parameter set. A rough sketch of such a model is presented next.
As briefly noted in the section on conflict-adaptation effects, a hybrid Stroop model that combines an item-level mechanism with a pathway-level mechanism would produce the ISPC effect, the LLPC effect, and a conflict-adaptation effect that is reduced but still present after removal of stimulus repetitions. To account for the error-related slowdown, this model would require a response priming mechanism. Thus, the model would have three separate loci for control: (a) item-level control, (b) pathway-level control, and (c) response priming, all of which would be subserved by a conflict-detection module. In addition to addressing behavioral phenomena, the described model would also inherit the ability to account for data from a large number of brain activation (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001; Kerns et al., 2004) and electrophysiological (e.g., Yeung et al., 2004; Yeung & Cohen, 2006) studies. The integration of these mechanisms is a computationally daunting task but would mark an important step forward in the formal development of the conflict-monitoring account.
3 Simulations with Model P and Model I support this claim. Both produce conflict-adaptation effects. In Model P, this effect is unaffected by the inclusion/exclusion of stimulus repetitions, whereas in Model I, the conflict-adaptation effect is eliminated following removal of stimulus repetitions. 4 In a preliminary set of simulations, such a model produced an ISPC effect, an LLPC effect, and a conflict-adaptation effect that was reduced but not eliminated following the removal of stimulus repetitions.
5 Botvinick et al. (2001) used a different parameter set for each different control phenomenon. Here, the same parameter set was used to simulate both the ISPC effect and the LLPC effect.
Conclusions
The present investigation introduced the idea of item-level control in the context of the conflict-monitoring hypothesis. We demonstrated that an existing model of the Stroop task with the addition of a conflict-monitoring mechanism based on this principle could account for both the ISPC effect and the LLPC effect with the same parameter set.
